Note:
This project will be discontinued after December 13, 2021. [more]
Product:
Cosign
(Sigstore)| Repositories |
Unknown: This might be proprietary software. |
| #Vulnerabilities | 4 |
| Date | Id | Summary | Products | Score | Patch | Annotated |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2023-11-07 | CVE-2023-46737 | Cosign is a sigstore signing tool for OCI containers. Cosign is susceptible to a denial of service by an attacker controlled registry. An attacker who controls a remote registry can return a high number of attestations and/or signatures to Cosign and cause Cosign to enter a long loop resulting in an endless data attack. The root cause is that Cosign loops through all attestations fetched from the remote registry in pkg/cosign.FetchAttestations. The attacker needs to compromise the registry... | Cosign | 5.3 | ||
| 2022-09-14 | CVE-2022-36056 | Cosign is a project under the sigstore organization which aims to make signatures invisible infrastructure. In versions prior to 1.12.0 a number of vulnerabilities have been found in cosign verify-blob, where Cosign would successfully verify an artifact when verification should have failed. First a cosign bundle can be crafted to successfully verify a blob even if the embedded rekorBundle does not reference the given signature. Second, when providing identity flags, the email and issuer of a... | Cosign | 5.5 | ||
| 2022-08-04 | CVE-2022-35929 | cosign is a container signing and verification utility. In versions prior to 1.10.1 cosign can report a false positive if any attestation exists. `cosign verify-attestation` used with the `--type` flag will report a false positive verification when there is at least one attestation with a valid signature and there are NO attestations of the type being verified (--type defaults to "custom"). This can happen when signing with a standard keypair and with "keyless" signing with Fulcio. This... | Cosign | 9.8 | ||
| 2022-02-18 | CVE-2022-23649 | Cosign provides container signing, verification, and storage in an OCI registry for the sigstore project. Prior to version 1.5.2, Cosign can be manipulated to claim that an entry for a signature exists in the Rekor transparency log even if it doesn't. This requires the attacker to have pull and push permissions for the signature in OCI. This can happen with both standard signing with a keypair and "keyless signing" with Fulcio. If an attacker has access to the signature in OCI, they can... | Cosign | 3.3 |